Not Zero-Sum: Perspective of an Ordinary Chinese American
In the era of Trump/Putin/Xi, an ordinary Chinese American's hope for solidarity (Chapter Eleven)
Chapter 11: On Democracy
In 1863, when President Lincoln delivered his iconic address at Gettysburg, in addition to abolishing slavery, reuniting the Union, he had something else in mind—something that had larger implications for the fate of the people around the world. Lincoln believed that the American Civil War was also a test of whether a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” can long endure.
His intuition proved prescient. Since the successful conclusion of the Civil War, democracy has thrived. In 1860, the number of democratic nations could be counted with the fingers on one hand. Today, more than half of all countries boast a democratic government, as many sought to model themselves after the leader of the free world, which in turn believed its exceptionalism was rooted in its form of political system.
However, while the world was shifting toward self-government, cracks had begun to form in American democracy. The House is afflicted by gerrymandering, the district map drawing scheme where the incumbents chose their voters rather than the other way around. Meanwhile, the Senate has a structural problem. Although the Founding Fathers had designed the upper chamber with the explicit intention of ensuring equal representation for smaller states, they couldn’t have foreseen that the population disparity would grow to 68 multiples between the most populous state (California) and the least populous state (Wyoming), such that underrepresentation has tilted drastically the other way against larger states.
The problem of representation is even more acute when it comes to the Electoral College, which, in addition to inheriting the Senate’s issue, doesn’t take into account how many votes a state is won by—winning by 1,000,000 votes has the same effect as winning by 1 vote. The immediate ramification is that, for any presidential election, only a handful of battleground states actually matter, and the last two Republican presidents had won despite losing the popular vote*—results that were arguably undemocratic. The more chronic impact is that the Supreme Court now has an identity mismatch with the average American on a wide range of issues, since despite the Democrats winning the popular vote in 7 out of 8 past presidential elections, 6 out of 9 Supreme Court justices have been appointed to lifetime positions by Republican presidents.
The biggest problem we face though is Congress’s inability to tackle any of these fundamental issues. The Constitution relies on the premise that our political parties would consistently put national interests above party interests, an assumption that has always been challenged, but especially so in today’s political climate. To make matters worse, the latest gridlock in Washington has gradually spread to ordinary Americans through populist rhetorics that drift further and further away from the truth, dividing us in a vicious cycle that reduces the electability of the more moderate candidates.
Prior to 2021, this is where most descriptions of American democracy could pivot, that despite these flaws, the core foundations of our democracy—civil rights, rule of law, and the peaceful transfer of power—remained secure. As Prime Minister Churchill would say, “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.” However, based on recent developments in the US, there are real threats to this version of democracy: the storming of the Capitol seemed like a bad dream, and Republicans caving to a giddy Trump prolonged the nightmare. As the 2022 midterm elections approached, the GOP continued to promote candidates who insist on debasing the nature of our political engagements, tarnishing America’s global image, and betraying the ideals of democracy—until perhaps we are no longer worthy of its best intentions.
Internationally, January 6th marked a shocking culmination of America’s decline under the Trump administration. Public opinion of the US had already reached record low by 2020 among key allies (UK, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, Australia), a downturn that coincided with an uptick in authoritarianism around the world. As footage of the chaotic scene at the Capitol replayed across the globe, it felt like not just a blow to the peaceful transfer of power in America, but the idea of democracy itself.
Even China had been confounded by what took place. According to General Milley's testimony, the CCP was concerned that the US might launch an attack on China during the tumultuous events. While he didn’t elaborate on why, it’s plausible that China perceived Trump’s actions—sabotaging US-China relations to deflect blame for the pandemic, spreading falsehoods about election results, and inciting an attack on the US government—as precursors to even more drastic measures to cling to power. The unexpected reaction from China offered a window into the global significance of American stability, as well as the CCP’s real surprise that just 31 years after Chinese students had tried to bring democracy to China, a mob of rioters under the encouragement of the president would attempt to dismantle democracy in America.
When China opened up in the 1980s with a newfound embrace for the free market, the West all but assumed that it would soon turn toward democracy. For a while, the confidence seemed well-placed. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the political and economic reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union fell into places like pieces of a puzzle that revealed world democracy. During the excited times of 1989, as Chinese student protests seeking democratic reforms broached unknown territory and found genuine empathy among the more progressive leaders in the Communist Party, China came very close to a political inflection point of its own. Yet in the exchanges that followed, like an adolescent relationship that shared hearts but lacked experience, the two sides could never quite reach a complete understanding, if they even knew what they had been searching for in the first place. The failed reconciliations strengthened the conservatives in the party, who had preferred a more iron-fisted response spearheaded by the military, and the nascent student movement ended in the denunciation of progressive leaders and the agony of the Tiananmen Square incident, which remains a symbol of defiance against authoritarianism and a source of the Chinese government’s insecurity today.
Though the condemnation of the CCP had been swift, there was nevertheless a general consensus in the West that China would soon reach the promised land—a feeling that reflected the optimism of that magical era, when wall fell, war ended, and men chose progress. But in its exuberance, the West hadn’t quite fully appreciated the greatness of Gorbachev, who possessed that rare quality—the self-willingness to relinquish power for the greater good. Moreover, the West had overlooked the fact that while it celebrated the collapse of the Soviet Union and considered the independence movement of its satellite states a welcoming development, the Chinese Communist government viewed the same events with great alarm and had no interest in losing its border regions. And so over the next 30 years, as China remained politically unchanged under President Jiang Zemin, trended toward greater liberty under President Hu Jintao, and then reversed course under President Xi Jinping, it could never meet the expectation of the West.
Despite China’s recent reversal under Xi, its path to democracy remains an intuitive one. To stay competitive, the Chinese government will need to continue to invest in education, boosting the engine behind productivity and innovation. As a greater percentage of the population becomes more educated, more individuals will want to express their opinions, and restrictions on freedom of speech will need to be relaxed. As people speak out more frequently on the injustices of society, rule of law will need to be applied more vigorously. And with these changes, the groundwork for a democracy will be in place. Of course, the government could try to clamp down on these natural progressions, believing that it could contain the aspirations of its citizens without harming the health of the nation, but it would be wishful thinking that would only lead to a less prosperous China, just as Hong Kong, now a shell of its former self, has already experienced.
But while it’s possible to map out China’s potential steps toward democracy, there are several obstacles too. To start, the appeal of democracy may not be self-evident—if you have never lived in one. The CCP certainly won’t be advocating for it in China, and those looking for clues from America may have to squint harder lately. Even if you suspect democracy might be better, it’s not easy to let go of the only system you have known, one where you spent decades mastering the rules as a common citizen before becoming a decision-maker in the CCP.
As I have gotten older, I have grown to appreciate Gone With the Wind—its portrayal of attachment to a way of life, reflected also in the divide between Democrats and Republicans, deepened by mutual criticisms and caricatures of each other. Similarly, American opposition toward China not only renders democracy less attractive to the Chinese people but also weakens those most sympathetic to democratic values. In the current climate of US-China relations, any endorsement of America is dangerous and could jeopardize careers.
Ultimately, while societal shifts may eventually generate greater demand for fresh liberties, it remains a question of how the CCP leaders will react when the time comes. Voluntarily relinquishing power requires a level of altruism greater than Republicans holding Trump accountable and less than the US unconditionally submitting to the UN. Given the sufferings China experienced in the 20th century, the past cruelties that had hardened men of older generations, it’s possible that my age group represents part of the first wave of younger generations that would be more open to change—if they don’t become too disenchanted with the West and thus democracy by association.
During my time at the MBA program, I was fortunate to be part of a deliberately diverse global class, with ~30% international enrollment. From our classroom discussions and personal interactions, what had struck me was the similarity in values and aspirations among the majority of my classmates—a shared recognition that molded our collective worldview over the next two years.
However, I find myself wondering whether the memories of us huddling in the roundabout hallway, proudly wearing t-shirts that declared “love is love,” or when we crammed into a single apartment singing “Happy Birthday” in multiple languages, still reflect the version of America that comes to mind when my Chinese classmates recall their experiences, or if these memories have since been tainted by tweets and policies, from a man whose worldview seems confined to the patches of his wallet. I wonder too how their perceptions of America will shape the future of China. After all, Xi Jinping had visited America as a young man on an agricultural research trip, his daughter graduated from Harvard University, and a century ago, a young Mao Zedong had been enamored with America until he became disillusioned by the gap between its soaring rhetorics and inconsistent executions during the Woodrow Wilson era.
For the Chinese people, who have a knack for emulating best practices, the most impactful way the US can influence China in an interconnected world is by setting good examples—particularly on the delicate topic of democracy. While dictators probably reveled in America’s recent struggles, just as monarchies once celebrated the American Civil War as a boon to their existence, the US can still remind everyone of its resiliency. Although South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan all boast self-governments that are geographically closer, none matches the size or social complexity of China as well as the US does. If the US articulates its values in the form of tangible outcomes—free from the distractions of critical tone, perceived condescension, and deficient trust—the message will find its audience.
With that said, the exchange doesn’t need to be a soliloquy. The choice of political system is inherently multifaceted, each option offering its own merits and challenges, each nation its own complications and development cycles. As always, the US and China can learn from each other.
Today, the lower levels of the Chinese government take form of a meritocracy by examination, a tradition rooted in Confucianism. Each year, millions of aspiring civil servants take the guo-kao, or civil service exam, to compete for a few thousand placements and an entry into the Chinese government. Although the American ideal—that any native-born citizen can become the leader of a nation—is meaningful, I can appreciate the practicality of an unbiased qualification filter to serve in public office too, especially given the historic role of merit in Chinese culture. If America were to consider adopting something similar, I would recommend an assessment of commitment to public service for candidates running for higher offices.
From entry levels to the top of the Chinese government, it’s a bureaucracy much like a large corporation, where civil servants climb the ladder based on both performances and relationships with superiors. The higher up the rungs, the farther removed from the ordinary people as stakeholders, and the balance increasingly tilts toward the big bosses—a setup that can favor the coverup of unfavorable developments, especially when career advancements hang in the balance.
Like larger corporations, the CCP fields local offices and regional leaders, but its most potent power is centralized at the headquarters in Beijing. At the apex of the hierarchy sits the Politburo, a nine-member body akin to the c-suite, tasked with key decisions including the selection of the president and the vice premier every five years. Former Politburo members form a small but influential group akin to the board of directors, although in recent years, Xi’s adept consolidation of power has effectively relegated this group to retirees with ceremonial status. The Politburo itself has also become increasingly dominated by Xi’s allies, who abolished presidential term-limits and are poised to elect Xi for an unprecedented third term in the 2022 congressional gathering. At the moment, China is closer to an autocracy than a democracy.
If I prefer democracy over other political systems, it’s because the people are its ultimate stakeholders. Its interpretation of roles incentivizes individual rights, rule of law, and stability. However, that doesn’t mean democracy is infallible. While I generally trust the variance of millions over the variance of the few, the millions can be misled. For example, Germany was a democracy when Hitler rose to power, riding the “big lie” of 1918, which claimed that Germany had not been defeated in WWI but was betrayed by Jews. The spread of false narratives, a close cousin to the censorship of truth, has further proliferated in the age of the internet.
If we must allow disinformation under the guise of freedom of speech, then a quality education that hones independent thinking would make a good addendum to democracy. As conservatives and liberals debate the path to better education between family values and public education reforms in America, China embraces both, translating theory into practice.
One advantage of the current Chinese one-party government is that it possesses the mandate to formulate and commit to long-term strategies. In contrast, it can be difficult to find continuity in the US from one presidency to the next, especially under more polarized environments. The new administration often devotes its first round of actions to undoing the work of the previous administration—reversals that can upend lives of individuals, disrupt the operations of domestic agencies and businesses, and leave foreign governments feeling blindsided or even betrayed by American inconsistencies.
The focus on winning the next election also inevitably invites short-term thinking. For example, raising taxes or implementing climate change measures that result in higher energy prices currently amount to political suicide, even if they favor American interests in the long-run. Combined with the private sector’s relentless pursuit of quarterly earnings, America badly needs a long-term counterbalance—a cornerstone of society that focuses on longevity rather than expediency.
The biggest and perhaps fatal flaw with a one-party government though is that there is no check on whether the party is actually serving the people’s best interest and no alternative when the people disagree with the party. In the extreme case, a one-party democracy is essentially a cover for dictatorship. Granted, at the other end of the spectrum, multiple parties could lead to gridlocks where bills are voted strictly along party lines and progress becomes just about impossible. The US Constitution, a document over 200 years old, has been amended only 27 times since its creation and none in the last 20 years, a testament certainly to the Founding Fathers’ genius, but lately, also an indictment of our inability to adapt—the living document gone dormant.
I believe an effective democracy needs at least two political parties, but it also requires iterative reforms to jump-start the spirit of compromise. America could, for instance, convene a new vicennial conference comprising 20 participants, 10 Democrats and 10 Republicans known for their moderate voting records, and empower these men of reason to negotiate and draft constitutional improvements that dismantle entrenched interests and keep pace with the evolutions of society.
But the men of appetite seem to hold the gavel now. Though the concept of continuous improvement sounds simple, in politics, it is entangled in the web of short-term thinking, special interests (e.g., NRA), and self-serving agendas. This quagmire can make even the most reasonable proposal for change feel like the script out of a Mission Impossible movie. Yet if America wants to achieve linear progress, it must consistently find the motivation and capacity to be its better version. As a wise friend once said: “Getting to the top is easy; staying there is hard.”
Similarly, for China, progress will depend on the quality of its leaders and the engagement of its citizens. With survival needs met, the focus now shifts toward the pursuit of dreams. Rather than imposing additional layers of control that smother both liberties and economic growth, the government needs to make room for the aspirations of the people through incremental reforms.
When I first grasped the fundamental differences between American and Chinese governments, I thought the latter should converge to the former at once. Yet as I observed the Soviet Union’s unsteady path to Russian “democracy,” the unlikely election of Trump, the revisionist narratives around January 6th, and the erosion of substance in recent American elections, I recognized the necessity to ground progress in practicality. China’s path from ideal to reality is further complicated by its aversion to foreign influence, its contentious relationship with America, its historic emphasis on stability, and an underlying uncertainty—if China were to democratize, would the US truly accept it, or any other nation, eclipsing American dominance? The events from the past decade obscured the truths that I once saw, such that it may not be as simple as flipping a democratic switch made in China (though maybe it is).
Instead, like the older experts on US-China, I find myself grudging not speed but direction. In the aftermath of China’s authoritarian shift under Xi, I felt their disappointment in the shouting silence as Trump unraveled the relationship, and zero-sum views seeped into relevance. Yet, I don’t believe we can afford to stay quiet—not only because it unfairly diminishes my Chinese half, but also because it undermines all Americans. It’s a mistake to let Trump claim success when all he has done is impose a sales tax in the form of tariffs, drive China and Russia closer together in opposition to the US, and weaken global faith in American values—when he embodies America’s own retreat from progress.
Lately, it feels like both the US and China have lost momentum. Zag too long, you risk falling back into orbit—deadweights trapped in the loop, waiting for the next divergence. The GOP’s prioritization struggle between party fealty and national interest mirrors the CCP’s insistence that party interest equates to national interest. Which party thinks bigger first is the kind of competition that should define US-China relations.
Should China one day welcome its Gorbachev, it will have the opportunity to consult America’s path, especially since the two nations share some of the same underlying social dynamics.
Similar to the US, China faces an aging population, younger generations have gained in education quality, and the divide between cities and rural areas is even more acute, partially because of the astronomical differences in academic resources, and partially because China has hu-kou, a household registration system that currently provides greater public benefits to urban residents. As a location constraint on real-estate purchases, hu-kou also represents a source of income disparity, since rising property values in the cities have been a primary driver of wealth. Moreover, with 55 minority ethnicities and a dominant Han ethnicity, China has possibly a more challenging task than America to manage ethnic cohesion. As the French philosopher Alex de Tocqueville noted, the tyranny of the majority presents an inherent weakness of democracy—aggravating ethnic divisions in some self-governing nations—and I believe it will be one of China’s biggest hurdles too.
Given that China’s border regions is home to several minority groups and the Chinese government’s attempts to introduce greater cultural integrations in these regions have often led to ethnic conflicts, it makes sense for China to take notes from America's incremental progress in diversity that has led to less violence, increased understanding, and wisdom gained from embracing a wider range of perspectives. As a Chinese popular saying goes, “three smelly cobblers are better than Zhuge Liang,” or three common people will have greater combined wisdom than China’s most revered military strategist from the Three Kingdoms era. Well, three smelly cobblers of different ethnicities are even better.
* this chapter was written before the 2024 election
Chapter Twelve: Seeking the Truth (coming 05/19) →
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Chapter Eleven End Notes:
more than half of all countries boast a democratic government: “Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic” by Drew Deliver, Pew Research Center (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/)
68 multiples between the most populous state (California) and the least populous state (Wyoming)… The more chronic impact is that Supreme Court now has an identity mismatch…: “‘A Crisis Coming’: The Twin Threats to American Democracy” by David Leonhardt, The New York Times, (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/17/us/american-democracy-threats.html)
Public opinion of the US had already reached record low by 2020 among key allies: "The Trump era has seen a decline in America’s global reputation” by Richard Wike, Pew Research Center (https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/11/19/the-trump-era-has-seen-a-decline-in-americas-global-reputation/)
As the 2022 midterm elections approached, the GOP continued to promote candidates who insist on debasing the nature of our political engagements: “Republicans in key battleground races refuse to say they will accept results” by Amy Gardner, Hannah Knowles, Colby Itkowitz, and Annie Linskey, The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/18/republicans-refuse-accept-results/)
According to General Milley's testimony, the CCP was concerned that the US might launch an attack on China during the tumultuous events: “Gen. Milley explains his calls with China over concerns about President Trump,” PBS News (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-gen-milley-explains-his-calls-with-china-over-concerns-about-president-trump)
a young Mao Zedong had been enamored with America until he became disillusioned by the gap…: The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom by John Pomfret
Hitler rose to power, riding the “big lie” of 1918, which claimed that Germany had not been defeated in WWI but was betrayed by Jews: “How Hitler’s enablers undid democracy in Germany” by Christopher R. Browning, The Atlantic (https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/10/nazi-germany-hitler-democracy-weimar/671605/)
Further reading: Chinese Lessons by John Pomfret for a firsthand account of Tiananmen Square in June, 1989