Not Zero-Sum: Perspective of an Ordinary Chinese American
In the era of Trump/Putin/Xi, an ordinary Chinese American's hope for solidarity (Chapter Seven)
← Chapter Six: 2008 - Two Proud Moments
Chapter 7: Progress Zigzags
As inspirational as the 2008 election was, the 2016 election brought an equal measure of despair. Perhaps that’s the genius of American democracy—before grievance brews for too long, it’s released into the ballot box, in the form of higher turnout. Then perhaps there is truth that the same fights are fought time and again, but I would like to think that even as we go through the cycles of history, like time traveling the four seasons, the overall trend is forward. As President Obama and Dr. King had quoted: “the arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.” For me, this quote took on different meanings at different moments in time—when Obama was elected president, it was validation; and when Trump was elected president, it was a test of faith.
My issue with Donald Trump lies in the fact that he misrepresented his intentions for the presidency. If he had said, “I’m running for the President of the United States, so that I can leverage its vast power solely to advance my personal interests, public interests be damned,” then I’d respect that he had told the truth, and if he had still won, my gripes would instead be with the people who voted for him. Despite his less civilized behaviors, I don’t necessarily believe Trump is a racist, an anti-semite, an anti-LGBTQ, or a Republican / Democrat (as he had been in 2001) for that matter, but rather he has no morals, and so he is unrestrained in his pursuit of self-interests, whether in business, politics, or interpersonal relationship.
And my issue is not with the real-estate mogul as a person, but rather the fact that he decided to run for office. If Trump were just a normal citizen, then to me, he would be just a salesman who is excessively greedy and somewhat shady, but not much harm unless you are stuck doing business with him. However, as the head of state, his negative influences are exponentially amplified. The inability to put America’s interests on par with his personal interests in any sense is a deal breaker for me.
Trade War with China
Similar to Patrick J Hurley, the special emissary who torpedoed the Dixie Mission during WWII, Trump based diplomacy on personal considerations rather than intelligence reports. Every time he spoke of Putin, the world saw America pull a little closer toward Russia, no questions asked (or needed). Why Trump turned against China presented a harder puzzle. Presumably, it was not because of Xi’s authoritarian shift; more likely, Trump found familiarity in China’s transactional approach to international relations—here’s a nation that does away with others as I only dream of.
While still on the campaign trail, Trump claimed that the trade deficit was a problem—China was “ripping off the United States” because it exported more goods than it imported. However, most economists disagreed with Trump, in what would become a recurring trend. As a developing country with cheaper labor and lower manufacturing costs, importing from China reduced expenses for American consumers. Personally, I believe the trade deficit between the US and China is entirely superficial.
In today’s interconnected economies, many of the Chinese exported goods are merely assembled in China. For example, the iPhone relies on components sourced from a basket of global suppliers. Its display reports from South Korea, its memory chip hails from Japan, and, of course, its design and software originate from Apple’s headquarters in Cupertino, California. When all these different parts rendezvoused in Shenzhen, the manufacturing process to integrate them cost less than $20 out of the hefty final price tag that can run north of $1,000. While Trump’s tweets conveniently reflected the officially reported trade deficit, roughly $375 billion in 2017, the adjusted trade deficit based on estimates of actual value from China was $239 billion, less than 2/3 of the original amount.
In addition, the trade deficit doesn’t capture direct sales from American storefronts operating in China, which count toward Chinese domestic revenue rather than American exports. Apple, Nike, Starbucks, Disney, and KFC represent just a few prominent examples of American companies with local Chinese stores. For reference, Apple sells approximately 20% of its iPhones in China, or ~$50 billion in revenue per year. In contrast, the only Chinese company with physical storefront in the US that comes to mind is AMC, and its revenue in the US is ~$5 billion per year, far lower than the sum of what the American companies generate in China.
Equally important, the trade deficit is currently evaluated based on revenue. If the idea is that we treat it as an indicator of which nation is reaping more benefits, then it makes more sense to look at profit instead. If we were able to make this switch, then I suspect China, rather than the US, will be the one carrying the deficit, since China exports mostly cheaper goods with lower margins to the US, whereas the US exports mostly brand products that command higher margins to China. In fact, even KFC and McDonald’s operate as mid-upper tier restaurants in China. It was with a mixed feeling of amusement and complicity that I experienced ketchup packets rationed like luxury items and fries consumed like a delicacy—a meticulous process of the sauce lightly squeezed from its packet and applied to the tip of each fries. Although I have to admit the food does taste better and the decors look much nicer too, especially in smaller cities where they are closer to novelties than their more humble roots in America.
To “solve” the trade deficit, Trump levied heavy tariffs on Chinese goods starting in 2018. While I vaguely recall the supply and demand curves that magically capture every mercantile scenario from economics class, I do remember the punchline on tariffs: it’s a lose-lose tactic. From history class, the Smoot-Hawley tariff from the 1930s, which had drawn parallels to the Trump tariffs, was a blunder that prolonged the Great Depression. From law, legal precedences in the United States dictate that tariffs should only be used for national security reasons. For example, in the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US and other nations can band together to impose tariffs as one form of sanction on Russia, so that Russia suffers a lot from the combined effects of multinational tariffs, while the US and other nations each suffer a little. However, Trump imposed tariffs not only on China but also a host of other nations, including American allies—the European Union and Canada—drawing the ire of Prime Minister Trudeau, who scoffed at the idea of Canada being a national security threat to the US. Unsurprisingly, most nations retaliated with their own tariffs on American goods. China specifically targeted the goods produced by potential Trump supporters.
By December 2018, a study by the Journal of Economic Perspectives found that “Trump’s tariffs had resulted in a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month in deadweight losses.” A Goldman Sachs analysis in May 2019 further confirmed the inflationary impacts of Trump’s tariffs: “the consumer price index (CPI) for tariffed goods had increased dramatically, compared to a declining CPI for all other core goods.” Internationally, in addition to annoying American allies, Trump’s tariffs also ran counter to WTO’s goal of promoting free trade, potentially undermining America’s credibility as it tries to reign in China’s more questionable trade practices at the same time. In fact, when China filed a complaint that the US had broken its commitments on tariffs, the WTO sided with China.
To be fair, the Trump tariffs did motivate some American companies to shift manufacturing out of China. However, the decline in Chinese exports did not bring manufacturing jobs back to the US as Trump had advertised. Instead, as economists predicted, those companies simply moved manufacturing to other developing nations with lower costs.
Unlike the trade deficit, intellectual property (IP) theft by China represents a real challenge. Seeking distinction from predecessors who handled the issue without much fanfare, Trump blasted his complaints through Twitter. While Trump’s tweets, characterized by rampant capitalizations and exclamation marks, might generate the headlines and ratings paramount to the former reality TV star, their 140 character limits and shortage on substance hardly convey the full story. On the IP theft issue, one significant omission is that if the US were in China’s shoes, it would probably do the same thing. In fact, two centuries ago, during the height of the Industrial Revolution, the US didn’t have second thoughts “procuring” industrial secrets from Great Britain, and it was only after the US became a leading industrial power that it became a champion of IP protections.
Today, experts estimate that the US is losing hundreds of billions of dollars annually due to IP theft by China—a reflection of both the vast size of the Chinese market and the prevalence of such offenses. It doesn’t help that learning from the best, like Kobe “stealing” MJ’s basketball moves, is very much ingrained in Chinese culture. For example, artists covering popular songs from other artists represent the norm in China, whereas it’s much less mainstream in the US. And from personal experience, “learn from the better students” was a refrain that I had heard all too often from both parents and Chinese teachers. This cultural emphasis on replicating others’ success exacerbates the IP issue, and it’s one of the reasons why the US has had the most headaches from China, even though just about all countries engage in some form of IP espionage. And as Trump demonized China, blithely shaping Americans’ perceptions, I would like to offer the angel’s advocate that the problem’s existence is more proof of American leadership in technology than maliciousness on the part of the Chinese. The issue is also not unique to the US; Chinese companies “procure” trade secrets from other trade partners too as well as peer Chinese companies.
Only a few years ago, Russia had criticized China for reverse engineering its military technology, though these days it’s mostly resigned to getting as much revenue as possible from China, while it’s still able, before the Chinese clones hit the market. For the Chinese companies, although the current copycat environment has also inflicted pain, it’s been a catalyst too driving constant innovations and international competitiveness, whereas IP protections can sometimes lead to monopoly and complacency.
Consequently, when US companies consider entering China, they must weigh the allure of its enormous market against the risks of IP theft. Typically, consumer products based on brands make better candidates than commercial products based on technology. While China has been driving significant improvements in IP protections, there is always the inherent risk of exceptions due to the lack of commitment to rule of law. In worst case scenarios, Chinese companies first steal trade secrets from American companies and then leverage cheaper production costs to take market share not only in China but also around the world.
Huawei is such an example. The private Chinese company initially gained traction in telecommunication equipment in the late 1990s, allegedly boosted by stolen source code from Cisco Systems, whose IP lawsuit offered damaging evidence: Huawei telecom products had the exact user error messages with even the same misspellings as Cisco’s. Next, Huawei found success in the mobile phone space, surpassing Apple at one point in global market share while collecting a couple more IP lawsuits from T-Mobile and Motorola. More recently, it has evolved into a leader in 5G infrastructure, propelled by its outsized R&D investments and potentially large amount of subsidies from the Chinese government. As Huawei expanded, the Obama administration banned US government agencies from sourcing its telecom gears in 2013 to protect against cyber warfare, and the Trump administration expanded the ban to all US companies in 2019 due to security concerns arising from the development of 5G infrastructure.
In the case of Huawei, an opaque company with a history of IP thefts and undisclosed connections to the Chinese government, I believe the hardline approach taken by the US is warranted. We shouldn’t compromise on national security, even if it curtails free trade. The line gets thinner, however, with TikTok, the popular social media app owned by ByteDance, its Chinese parent company.
Unlike Huawei, TikTok doesn’t have a record of IP thefts or government connections, and its success has been driven by innovations not unlike the tales of the American unicorns. In July 2020, the circumstances surrounding the push to ban TikTok were also questionable. The original ban request came directly from Trump, who purportedly came to view the app as a national security risk less than a month after TikTokkers pranked the Trump campaign into believing that over one million people would attend his rally—when only six thousand people showed up.
While the Trump administration may cite user data risks, and while I agree with its assessment that TikTok wouldn’t be able to block the Chinese government from accessing user data, the argument from TikTok’s lawsuit—Trump’s desire to ban TikTok was motivated by personal vendetta—sounds closer to the truth. After all, the vast majority of TikTok contents range from funny, interesting, to inspirational, and they are uploaded by a global community of users with the intent to connect and entertain, rather than to be secretive.
Some critics have noted that many US tech platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google are banned in China, and so as a counter move, TikTok should be similarly banned in the US. However, it’s sort of comparing apples to oranges. Facebook and Twitter are banned in China because Chinese dissidents had used their platforms to organize, and the social media companies had been unwilling to share the dissidents’ data with the Chinese government. Meanwhile, Google voluntarily exited mainland China due to its unwillingness to comply with China’s censorship requirements.
In both cases, the root cause stems from the misalignment between Chinese government objectives and American company values, rather than an outright ban of American tech companies. It’s worth noting that the US government has also clashed with American tech companies over access to user data. A more apple to apple comparison is befittingly Apple, which hasn’t been banned by the Chinese government out of fear that the US government might access Chinese citizens’ data.
As the trade war escalated, the battle of commercial interests spilled over to people. The arrest and detainment of Huawei CFO felt like it crossed a line, a downcast of person to pawn, her livelihood a form of leverage, like Russia detaining WNBA star Brittney Griner during the Ukraine War.
The China Initiative, launched purportedly to combat IP theft and reinforce Trump’s national security strategy, felt more like a series of trumped up charges intended for appearances and boosting political fortunes. The initiative targeted faculties / researchers of Chinese descent, presumptuously putting their lives under the microscope (without cause) and exposing them to persecutions based on mostly technicalities unrelated to IP theft or espionage. The misconducts and racial bias that plagued the initiative raised the specter of Japanese internment during WWII. It also reminded me of the Uyghur human rights issues in China—the slippery slope where national security is the justification for injustice.
While the China Initiative made almost no progress on the IP theft front, it did antagonize a group of talented people, pushing them to at least consider conducting research in China instead—probably the one thing America shouldn’t do when it’s trying to compete with China on talent and innovation. While some may say that doing research for China instead of the US under any condition is treasonous, I would argue that for certain people—especially those with multicultural backgrounds—they simply want to make a positive impact on the world, and that the US vs. China is the complication.
It was partially this disposition to view the world as a larger community (and no doubt the influence of my personal background) that softened my views on IP theft during China’s initial development—how do we balance incentivizing innovation with lifting millions of people out of poverty (or compensating pharmaceutical companies while keeping life-saving drugs affordable)?
But as China grew more prosperous, my views shifted toward fairness: it’s reasonable for the US to demand compliance, levy fines, or apply bans on specific Chinese companies when China fails to take action. However, I found Trump’s populist tactics counterproductive at best (betraying American values at worst), the opposite of the hard diplomacy required to make real progress. By refusing to acknowledge China’s perspective, it removes China’s incentive to respect American interests.
While China’s situation is compounded by its efficiency in learning from others and the magnitude of loss correlated to the size of its population, its IP laws have been steadily strengthening, and its path hasn’t been all that different from “the United States’ own centurylong drift toward stronger protections.” History has shown that “countries do not enact strong IP rights system until their ability to innovate at home displaces reliance on outside knowledge.”
As China moves along the arc of nation building, self-interests should bring China closer to America’s views. A more effective approach, then, would be to engage the Chinese government constructively. In fact, when President Obama asked President Xi to stop state-sponsored espionage of commercial secrets and establish certain ground rules back in 2015, China mostly complied until Trump’s trade war escalations.
Overall, the trade war with China generated a lot of noise, confusions, and churns, but very little results. In fact, the overwhelming consensus has been that it hurt the US economy more than it helped. It made me question Trump’s motives, whether it was just incompetence resulting in both bad judgment and execution; whether it was a publicity stunt like slapping the Trump name on a hotel soothing ego; or whether it was something more nefarious such as a Trump organization secretly receiving kickbacks through backchannels, especially for imposing seemingly arbitrary steel and aluminum tariffs on American allies. The Ukraine incident also did not alleviate concerns of a quid-pro-quo presidency. And so as Trump flip-flopped on Twitter from Xi the friend to Xi the enemy, I was not surprised to learn that the timing of Trump’s concessions to China coincided with the approvals of trademarks in China for the Trump family and a Chinese loan to fund a Trump project in Indonesia.
What troubled me more though were the wedges that Trump deliberately drove between the Chinese and American people. By appealing to our worst instincts, like divorce lawyers beating the drums of discord, Trump created rifts that he could later exploit whether through populist support or dubious transactions.
The COVID-19 pandemic would put the worst effects of Trump on full display. As American sentiments toward China steadily declined under his influence, Trump would further manipulate this shift to enhance his own fortunes, a conflation of personal motives with public governance that will only make it harder for the US to pursue the best course of actions on China in the long run.
COVID-19
When coronavirus first hit in 2020, no one could have predicted the impact it would have. World leaders mostly downplayed its significance, driven by both lack of understanding and the desire to avoid causing panic. But now a couple years later, after more than half a billion reported cases, millions of deaths, and the chain of events and social adaptations including but not limited to travel bans, border shutdowns, lockdowns, mask mandates, work-from-homes, online classes, quarantines, social distancing, social unrests, stock market crashes and subsequent bubbles, vaccinations, supply chain disruptions, inflations, geopolitical conflicts, it feels like an understatement to say the world will never be the same.
Around mid-December 2019, people in Wuhan began turning up ill with flu-like symptoms and strange white spots on their lung scans, and most of the cases could be traced back to one of the city’s seafood markets. Two weeks later, a partial genetic sequence of the virus revealed a resemblance to the SARS virus and quickly circulated among local doctors. As information began bubbling up the hierarchy, local officials grappled with obtaining more data without alarming the public. January 5, 2020, labs across China, racing night and day, completed the full genetic sequence, but China’s National Health Commission had sent orders barring publication of results without prior authorization. January 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) finally received the complete sequence and confirmed to the world a novel coronavirus.
By then, hundreds of sick patients were starting to arrive at Wuhan hospitals each day, and earlier patients had begun to die. January 14, the Chinese central government ramped up its response, installing temperature checks and alerting hospitals nationwide, but publicly, it still tried to downplay the threat of the virus. January 19, as outbreaks appeared in other parts of China, President Xi publicly announced for the first time that the coronavirus “needed to be taken seriously.” Then on January 23, just one day removed from the eve of Chinese New Year, the Chinese government locked down Wuhan, a city of eight million, sending an unmistakable message to the rest of the world—or it should have.
The US government first learned about the coronavirus on January 3, 2020, when Chinese colleagues alerted the US CDC Director on the spread of an unknown virus. Two weeks later, senior advisers communicated directly with Trump but “struggled to get him to take the virus seriously.” January 20, the US reported its first case. When China announced the Wuhan lockdown a couple days later, it should have jolted the US government into action. However, over the next 50 days, as intel, advice, memos flooded into the White House from various agencies, the only precaution that the Trump administration took was closing the US border to China and select European countries. During the vital month of February, Trump was focused on reelection, holding large campaign rallies and threatening to fire officials who spooked the stock market with talks of the virus. Despite multiple audits underscoring the elevated risks a pandemic posed to the US, exacerbated by deregulations and funding cuts under its term, the Trump administration made little efforts to prepare.
So when it became apparent that multiple hotspots were emerging in early March, the US was short on testing kits, masks, and ventilators. The Trump administration had ramped up neither domestic manufacturing nor international imports. In fact, the administration didn’t place bulk orders for masks and ventilators until the middle of March. Faced with urgent requests for medical equipment from multiple states, Trump claimed that state governments were responsible for procuring the medical equipment on their own, in a move that reminded me of the Chinese Qing government leaving local governments to fend off the British invasions during the Opium War. Jared Kushner further added that the national reserve of medical supplies was for the federal government’s own use, because states have so much expertise in international commerce, and because it makes so much sense for states to bid against each other rather than leverage economies of scale.
When the US finally did secure sufficient masks and ventilators, Trump chose to turn his back on science and politicize the wearing of masks, because the inconvenience of putting on a mask is comparable to the risk of the vulnerable population dying, because masks are ineffective and doctors and nurses are only wearing them to look the part, and because getting reelected is more important than saving lives. In times of adversity, leaders are often the difference in whether the people come together or split apart. Under Trump’s divisive influence, something as simple as wearing a mask to prevent the spread of a deadly, infectious disease became a point of contention among Americans.
And so it was not surprising that the US had one of the worst COVID-19 responses. Faced with backlash on his handling of the pandemic, Trump declared that it was not his fault, it was China’s fault, thus beginning the political campaign to scapegoat China. New tweets condemning China’s response supplanted earlier tweets praising China’s response. Public speeches were updated by crossing out “coronavirus” and replacing it with “Chinese virus,” even as the WHO had officially coined the virus COVID-19 specifically to mitigate the stigma associated with the place of origin. What mattered most was that Trump did not get blamed; the risk posed to Asian Americans took a backseat, and so did setting good long-term precedent that would encourage transparency in future epidemic response.
It’s true China’s initial COVID-19 response did hit some road bumps. Bureaucratic hierarchy drove delays as information propagated upward—most nations experienced some version of this—and lack of transparency also resulted in a lost week between the completion of the virus’s genetic sequence and when it was shared with the WHO. However, compared to the 50 days of inaction by the Trump Administration following China’s announcement of the Wuhan lockdown, it’s obvious where the responsibility lies.
One of the key factors that hampered the US’s response throughout the pandemic was that Trump only wanted to tackle the appearance of the problem rather than the problem itself. Perhaps the most telling was Trump’s reaction to the rapid development of the COVID-19 vaccine.
Given the vaccine’s effectiveness in reducing the severity of the virus and saving lives, one would have expected Trump, especially Trump, to tout its success and claim credit. However, Trump was uncharacteristically quiet. In fact, when he received the vaccine in January 2021, no one heard about it until it was discovered two months later, and it was Vice President Pence and President-elect Biden who live-broadcasted their vaccine shots to reassure and encourage Americans to do the same. Because Trump had embraced COVID-19 conspiracies—blatant lies such as COVID-19 is comparable to regular flu and masks are unnecessary and unmanly—he found it more important to preserve the false narratives than to promote life-saving vaccines.
Similarly, when China experienced early success containing the virus spread through a combination of mask mandates and social distancing, rather than collaborate with China to understand how similar measures might be applied to the American society, Trump focused on exploiting the stigma against China as the virus’s place of origin—a shortsighted move that could incentivize nations to hide future epidemics or backfire if an outbreak originates in the US. After all, the 1918 Spanish Flu had likely originated in Kansas, and it only retained its current name because Spain had experienced the worst impacts. By this line of reasoning, COVID-19 could be called the American virus—although I think it should be called the Trump virus.
Though the majority of Americans resisted Trump’s influences on most topics, reflected in his consistently low approval rating, his attacks on China struck a chord. Given the circumstances, the presence of raw emotions toward China was understandable, but where there were wounds, Trump could always be counted on to pour salt, escalating tensions in order to minimize his own faults.
While many voices were quick to rebuke Trump for the ramifications of his rhetoric on Asian Americans, no one was going to step in and defend China—the battle against tribalism stopped at national borders. Against the backdrop of COVID-19 and CCP’s authoritarian shift, silence made practical sense, although the vacuum also invited previously fringe views to disseminate into the mainstream, tilting the US toward a zero-sum approach on China that denies my very existence.
In China, the Trump administration’s attacks led to a rise in nationalism as well as anti-American sentiments. America’s poor handling of the pandemic, coupled with Trump’s unfair COVID-19 criticisms, cost the US prestige and effected a loss of admiration among the Chinese people. Conversely, the CCP gained esteem in the estimation of the Chinese people as they saw their government succeed where the American government had faltered. However, China failed to gain on the US internationally. Its initial “wolf warrior” response, an aggressive form of diplomacy intended to curry favor with domestic leaders rather than build international consensus, lacked the touch of empathy in a time of worldwide suffering.
The combative approaches served neither nation well in the eyes of the world. When Pew Research published its annual polls on global perceptions in 2020, among leaders of major nations, Trump had the lowest confidence rating, followed by Xi.
To me, in addition to being a multi-generational crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic also represented a series of lost opportunities. It was a lost opportunity for Americans to come together; it was a lost opportunity for America to project leadership worldwide; and it was a lost opportunity for collaboration between the US and China. At the beginning of the pandemic, the US had good reasons to learn from China, apply both science and common sense to mitigate the harms from a deadly disease. Two years later, as China struggles to contain the more infectious Omicron variant, it’s squandering the chance to learn from the US: the approval of the more effective mRNA vaccines and the prioritization of vaccinating the most vulnerable segments of the population followed by the gradual reopening of society. As China’s cities and people continue to experience lockdowns ahead of the 20th national congress gathering with no end in sight, it only highlights the lack of regards for individual liberty and wellbeing.
During the downturn in what is now arguably the world’s most important bilateral relationship, one of the few bright spots has been the collaboration between the people. It heartened me when Jack Ma committed to donating masks and testing kits to the US, and it heartened me when members of a Chinese alumni group that I had been a part of donated thousands of dollars of personal wealth to procure masks in China and ship them to their American alma mater’s university hospital, when news of other Chinese alumni groups donating masks to American health workers surfaced. These generous acts of goodwill by ordinary citizens gave me hope that when immediate passions have subsided, the “better angels of our nature” will return.
Though progress zigzags, we will move forward.
Chapter Eight: Butterfly Effects →
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Chapter Seven End Notes:
How iPhones skew US-China trade deficit: “Designed in California, made in China - how the iPhone skews U.S. trade deficit” by Adam Jourdan, Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-apple/designed-in-california-made-in-china-how-the-iphone-skews-u-s-trade-deficit-idUSKBN1GX1GZ)
Apple Revenue in China: (https://www.businessofapps.com/data/apple-statistics/)
AMC Revenue in the US: (https://www.statista.com/statistics/206959/revenue-of-amc-theatres/)
Prime Minister Trudeau, who scoffed at the idea of Canada being a national security threat to the US: “Trudeau: It’s ‘insulting’ that the US considers Canada a national security threat” by Luis Sanchez, The Hill (https://thehill.com/policy/international/390425-trudeau-its-insulting-that-the-us-considers-canada-a-national-security/)
A study published in fall 2019 in the Journal of Economic Perspectives found that by December 2018, Trump's tariffs resulted in a reduction in aggregate U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month in deadweight losses, and cost U.S. consumers an additional $3.2 billion per month in added tax. (Amiti, Mary; Redding, Stephen J.; Weinstein, David E. (2019). "The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 33 (Fall 2019): 187–210. doi:10.1257/jep.33.4.187)
A May 2019 Goldman Sachs analysis found that the consumer price index (CPI) for tariffed goods had increased dramatically, compared to a declining CPI for all other core goods. Fitzgerald, Maggie (May 13, 2019). "This chart from Goldman Sachs shows tariffs are raising prices for consumers and it could get worse". CNBC. Archived from the original on August 22, 2019.)
China filed a complaint that the US had broken its commitments on tariffs, the WTO sided with China: “W.T.O. Says American Tariffs on China Broke Global Trade Rules” by Ana Swanson, The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/business/economy/wto-trade-china-trump.html)
Jobs moving to Vietnam: "Vietnam Is Becoming The Big Winner In The China Trade Wars” by Warren Shoulberg, Forbes (https://www.forbes.com/sites/warrenshoulberg/2019/10/16/us-finally-succeeds-in-vietnam-as-more-companies-move-sourcing-there/)
Trade war impact on jobs in America: “U.S.-China trade war has cost up to 245,000 U.S. jobs: business group study”, Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/business/energy/us-china-trade-war-has-cost-up-to-245000-us-jobs-business-group-study-idUSKBN29J2O9/ )
It was only after the US became a leading industrial power that it became a champion of IP protections: “In trade wars of 200 years ago, the pirates were Americans” by Paul Wiseman, AP News (https://apnews.com/article/north-america-us-news-ap-top-news-theft-international-news-b40414d22f2248428ce11ff36b88dc53)
China IP theft from Russia: "Russia-China: What’s a Little IP Theft Between Friends?” By Robert Farley, The Diplomat (https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/russia-china-whats-a-little-ip-theft-between-friends/)
China IP laws improving: “China’s Record on Intellectual Property Rights Is Getting Better and Better” by Yukon Huang, Foreign Policy (https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/16/china-intellectual-property-theft-progress/)
Huawei IP lawsuits:
- Cisco, “Cisco says Huawei misstated facts in 2003 copyright case”, Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/cisco-says-huawei-misstated-facts-in-2003-copyright-case-idUSBRE89A1GF/)
- T-Mobile, “A Robot Named 'Tappy': Huawei Conspired To Steal T-Mobile's Trade Secrets, Says DOJ” by Laurel Wamsley, NPR (https://www.npr.org/2019/01/29/689663720/a-robot-named-tappy-huawei-conspired-to-steal-t-mobile-s-trade-secrets-says-doj)
- Motorola, “Motorola sues Huawei for trade secret theft”, by Phil Wahba and Melanie Lee, Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/world/motorola-sues-huawei-for-trade-secret-theft-idUSTRE66L0J2/)
TikTok / Trump Campaign / Trump ban:
- “Trump's campaign was trolled by TikTok users in Tulsa” by Donnie O’Sullivan, CNN (https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/21/politics/tiktok-trump-tulsa-rally/index.html)
- “Trump says he will ban TikTok” by Brian Fung, CNN Business (https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/21/politics/tiktok-trump-tulsa-rally/index.html)
Facebook and Google ban in China
- “China Blocks Access To Twitter, Facebook After Riots”, TechCrunch (https://techcrunch.com/2009/07/07/china-blocks-access-to-twitter-facebook-after-riots/)
“Why Google Is Quitting China” by Rebecca Fannin, Forbes (https://www.forbes.com/2010/01/15/baidu-china-search-intelligent-technology-google.html)
China initiative - misconduct:
“Amid New Trial, End of Chinese Espionage “Initiative” Brings Little Relief to US Academics Caught in Net of Fear” by Michael German and Alex Laing, Just Security (https://www.justsecurity.org/80780/amid-new-trial-end-of-chinese-espionage-initiative-brings-little-relief-to-us-academics-caught-in-net-of-fear/)
“Congressmen question 'FBI misconduct' after UT professor falsely accused of spying for China” by Jamie Satterfield, Knoxville News Sentinel, (https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/crime/2021/06/24/leaders-call-probe-fbi-after-claims-professor-spied-china/5308638001/)
The timing of Trump’s concessions to China [during the trade war] coincided with the approvals of trademarks for the Trump family and a Chinese loan to fund a Trump project in Indonesia:
“Ivanka Trump Wins China Trademarks, Then Her Father Vows to Save ZTE” by Sui-Lee Wee, The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/business/ivanka-trump-china-trademarks.html)
“Trump helps sanctioned Chinese phone maker after China delivers a big loan to a Trump project” by Matthew Yglesias, Vox, (https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/15/17355202/trump-zte-indonesia-lido-city)
Obama IP Theft conversation w/ China: “The Obama-Xi Summit and the Prospects for a Global Norm Against Commercial IP Theft” by Evan Burke, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/14/obama-xi-summit-and-prospects-for-global-norm-against-commercial-ip-theft-pub-84762)
Covid-19 China response timeline: “A Timeline of China’s Response in the First Days of COVID-19” by Priyanka Boghani, PBS (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-timeline-of-chinas-response-in-the-first-days-of-covid-19/)
Covid-19 US response timeline: “Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic and U.S. Response” by Ryan Goodman and Danielle Schulkin, Just Security (https://www.justsecurity.org/69650/timeline-of-the-coronavirus-pandemic-and-u-s-response/)
Trump claim state government is responsible for procuring medical equipment: “‘We’re not a shipping clerk’: Trump tells governors to step up efforts to get medical supplies” by Quint Forgey, Politico (https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/trump-governors-coronavirus-medical-supplies-137658)
Kushner claim national reserve of medical supplies is for federal government’s own use: “After Kushner says 'it's our stockpile,' HHS website changed to echo his comments on federal crisis role” by Ben Gittleson, ABC News (https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kushner-stockpile-hhs-website-changed-echo-comments-federal/story?id=69936411)
Trump Politicizing wearing masks: “In His Own Words, Trump on the Coronavirus and Masks” by Daniel Victor, Lew Serviss, and Ali Paybarah, The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/politics/donald-trump-masks.html)
Trump embracing conspiracies:
“Trump retweets conspiracy theory questioning COVID-19 death toll” by Peter Sullivan, The Hill (https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/514430-trump-retweets-conspiracy-theory-questioning-covid-19-death-toll/)
“All The Times Trump Compared Covid-19 To The Flu, Even After He Knew Covid-19 Was Far More Deadly” by Tommy Beer, Forbes (https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/09/10/all-the-times-trump-compared-covid-19-to-the-flu-even-after-he-knew-covid-19-was-far-more-deadly/)
Scapegoating China:
“Trump repeatedly praised China’s response to coronavirus in February” by Nathan McDermott and Andrew Kaczynski, CNN (https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/25/politics/trump-coronavirus-china/index.html)
“Photo of Trump remarks shows 'corona' crossed out and replaced with 'Chinese' virus” by Allan Smith, NBC News, (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/photo-trump-remarks-shows-corona-crossed-out-replaced-chinese-virus-n1164111)
“In U.N. Speech, Trump Blasts China And WHO, Blaming Them For Spread Of COVID-19” by Scott Neuman, NPR (https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/09/22/915630892/in-u-n-speech-trump-blasts-china-and-who-blaming-them-for-spread-of-covid-19)
Trump received Covid vaccine and did not tell anyone: “Trump and his wife received coronavirus vaccine before leaving the White House.” By Maggie Haberman, The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/us/politics/donald-trump-melania-coronavirus-vaccine.html)
Spanish Flu likely originated in Kansas: "Purple Death: The Great Flu of 1918” by Sara Francis Fujimura, Perspectives in Health (https://www.paho.org/en/who-we-are/history-paho/purple-death-great-flu-1918#:~:text=Despite%20its%20name%2C%20researchers%20believe,breeding%20ground%20for%20the%20virus.)
Chinese citizens’ reaction to Trump: “Pandemic nationalism rages among Chinese youths” by Yang Danxu (https://www.thinkchina.sg/society/pandemic-nationalism-rages-among-chinese-youths)
Trump and Xi confidence rating - global perceptions: “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly” by Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, Pew Research Center (https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly/)
Jack Ma donation: “Alibaba’s Jack Ma Sends Boxes of Coronavirus Test Kits and Masks to U.S.” by Lulu Yilun Chen / Bloomberg, Time (https://time.com/5803791/jack-ma-alibaba-coronavirus/)
Chinese students mask donation - a few examples among many:
“Alumni and Students From Greater China Donate PPE to NY Healthcare Workers Desperate for Gear” by Abigail Beshkin, Columbia Business, (https://business.columbia.edu/leading-through-crisis/columbia-business/alumni-and-students-greater-china-donate-ppe-ny-healthcare)
“Chinese students at Miami donate 5,000+ protective masks to community” by Margo Kissell, university news and communications (https://www.miamioh.edu/news/top-stories/2020/04/donated-masks.html)
“'Innermost truth is love': Brandeis parents donate 30,000 masks to Massachusetts General Hospital” by Douglas Moser, BrandeisNow (https://www.brandeis.edu/now/2020/april/coronavirus-donation-mgh-hospital.html)
“University’s Chinese Community Comes Together to Donate Masks to UVA Health” by Mandira Banerjee, UVAToday (https://news.virginia.edu/content/universitys-chinese-community-comes-together-donate-masks-uva-health)
“URI’s Chinese-American Community Steps Up to Protect Local First Responders” by Neil Nachbar (https://web.uri.edu/engineering/uncategorized/2020/04/uris-chinese-american-community-steps-up-to-protect-local-first-responders/)